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RESTORING BANKRUPTCY’S FRESH START 
Jonathan S. Hermann* 
 
The discharge injunction, which allows former debtors to be free from any 
efforts to collect former debt, is a primary feature of bankruptcy law in the 
United States.  When creditors have systemically violated debtors’ discharge 
injunctions, some debtors have attempted to challenge those creditors 
through a class action lawsuit in bankruptcy court.  However, the 
pervasiveness of class-waiving arbitration clauses likely prevents those 
debtors from disputing discharge injunction violations outside of binding, 
individual arbitration.  This Note first discusses areas of disagreement 
regarding how former debtors may enforce their discharge injunctions.  
Then, it examines the types of disputes that allow debtors to collectivize in 
bankruptcy court.  Without seeking to resolve either disagreement, this Note 
assumes debtors may collectivize in this context and employs an “inherent 
conflict” test that looks to whether disputes over discharge injunction 
violations are arbitrable.  Because the “inherent conflict” test likely leads to 
the conclusion that courts must enforce class-waiving arbitration clauses, 
this Note argues that Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code not only 
to provide debtors an express right of action under § 524 and the ability to 
collectivize, but also to prohibit the arbitration of these claims.  Doing so will 
give full effect to the discharge injunction and fulfill the promise to debtors 
that they can truly begin anew after bankruptcy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the case of an individual who emerges from bankruptcy.  Upon 
the closing of his bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court absolved him 
of all his remaining outstanding debt by way of a “discharge injunction.”1  
However, he soon discovers that a creditor with whom he had an outstanding 
balance prior to filing for bankruptcy—a credit card company, for example—
has not recognized that injunction.2  Perhaps the creditor failed to report the 
debt to consumer reporting agencies as having been discharged, resulting in 
 
 1. For a discussion of discharge injunctions in personal bankruptcy, see infra Part I.A.  
 2. See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy Still Mar 
Consumer Credit Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 9:45 PM), 
https://www.dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/debts-canceled-by-bankruptcy-still-mar-
consumer-credit-scores/ [https://perma.cc/JLX2-ADMV]. 
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the debt remaining on the individual’s credit reports.3  Or perhaps the creditor 
is still attempting to collect the debt4 or has even filed action in state court to 
collect on that debt.5 
Furthermore, our former debtor has discovered that he is not alone; the 
same creditor has failed to recognize the debts of many other former debtors 
as discharged.  Because it may not be cost effective to dispute the claims in 
court on an individual basis, he files his claim as a class action.6  Yet he faces 
an obstacle:  his credit agreement contained a class-waiving arbitration clause 
in which he agreed to resolve all disputes with his creditor in binding, 
individual arbitration.7 
At first blush, it would appear this class-waiving arbitration clause has 
impermissibly forced the debtor to relinquish his rights.  One of the primary 
purposes of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows 
plaintiffs to bring class action lawsuits in federal court,8 is to allow for the 
“vindication of ‘the rights of groups of people who individually would be 
without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’”9  A 
corollary to this purpose is to allow individual consumers, for whom the cost 
of litigation would far exceed their potential recovery, to join forces.10  As 
Judge Richard Posner famously observed, “The realistic alternative to a class 
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”11 
 
 3. Id.; see also Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (2012) 
(prohibiting creditors from knowingly furnishing inaccurate information to consumer 
reporting agencies). 
 4. See, e.g., Jason Green, California Cellphone Robocalls:  Debt Collection Giant iQor 
Sued for $10 Million, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 14, 2016, 11:23 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/09/14/santa-clara-county-debt-collection-giant-iqor-hit-
with-10m-robocall-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/8ZU6-FWSX] (discussing a credit collection 
agency’s alleged attempts to collect discharged debt by calling former debtors). 
 5. See, e.g., Miller v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc. (In re Miller), 282 F.3d 874, 875–76 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
 6. See Kara Bruce, The Debtor Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21, 37–38 (2013) (arguing that an 
individual plaintiff suing an institutional creditor for systematic misconduct may be “priced 
out of litigation”). 
 7. Indeed, arbitration clauses frequently contain class waivers. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:  REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) 10 (2015), 
http://www.files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVT4-23X4] (finding nearly all arbitration clauses studied include 
class waivers); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:  An Empirical Study 
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
871, 880, 884 (2008) (collecting a sample of consumer contracts of major telecommunications, 
credit, and financial services companies and finding that every consumer contract that 
contained a mandatory arbitration clause also included a class waiver). 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 9. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Benjamin 
Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969)). 
 10. See Brief for Professors of Civil Procedure & Complex Litigation as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938 
(3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (arguing that “small-value consumer cases . . . necessitated Rule 23”). 
 11. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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Federal bankruptcy law has also recognized the importance of class action 
lawsuits by allowing bankruptcy courts to hear class actions.12  However, 
despite our former debtor’s procedural right under federal law to sue as a 
representative of a class, there is a dispute as to whether he can overcome the 
class-waiving arbitration clause.13  In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant14 that Rule 23 does not 
establish “an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory 
rights.”15  In other words, Rule 23 is merely a procedural mechanism and 
does not itself provide litigants with a substantive right to litigate as a class.  
Therefore, a litigant may overcome a class-waiving arbitration clause if the 
federal law under which he is seeking to recover creates a substantive right 
to class litigation.16  Absent such a right, a plaintiff may only override such 
a clause if it were drafted to prevent a “prospective waiver of a party’s right 
to pursue statutory remedies.”17  In the case of our former debtor, this would 
mean he must show that the Bankruptcy Code somehow indicates Congress 
did not intend for class-waiving arbitration clauses in credit agreements to be 
enforceable in bankruptcy. 
However, there is uncertainty regarding the Italian Colors decision’s 
impact on bankruptcy courts, both with respect to determinations of 
arbitrability and to the enforceability of class waivers.18  Although the 
Bankruptcy Code does not expressly grant debtors a substantive right to 
litigate as a class, there remains an open question as to whether federal laws 
may nevertheless provide such a right absent express language.  For example, 
some circuits have held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
guarantees employee class actions, despite the lack of any express 
 
 12. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7023 (stating that Rule 23 applies in adversary proceedings).  
Although many class actions in bankruptcy concern a class of creditors suing a common 
debtor, they may also involve a class of debtors suing a creditor for a common injury. See 
Bruce, supra note 6, at 42; see also infra Part III. 
 13. This dispute is perhaps most evident in a recent intradistrict split in the Southern 
District of New York, discussed in Parts I.D.2 and IV. Compare Belton v. Ge Capital 
Consumer Lending, Inc. (In re Belton), No. 15-CV-1934 (VLB), 2015 WL 6163083, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2015) (reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision denying creditor’s motion 
to compel individual arbitration pursuant to a class-waiving arbitration clause), with Credit 
One Fin. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 553 B.R. 221, 233–34 (S.D.N.Y.) (affirming the 
bankruptcy court’s decision refusing to compel arbitration of a discharge injunction violation), 
appeal docketed, No. 16-2496 (2d Cir. July 13, 2016), and Credit One Fin. v. Anderson (In re 
Anderson), 550 B.R. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y.) (declining to review the bankruptcy court’s decision 
refusing to enforce a class-waiving arbitration clause), appeal docketed, No. 16-2496 (2d Cir. 
July 13, 2016).  At present, the Second Circuit has yet to resolve this split. See generally In re 
Anderson, 550 B.R. 228. 
 14. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 15. Id. at 2309 (emphasis added). 
 16. Id. at 2309–10. 
 17. Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).  Although the Court acknowledged that an arbitration forum may, 
in certain circumstances, be made impracticable by high filing and administrative fees, it 
nevertheless held that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory 
remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.” Id. at 2310–
11. 
 18. See Kara J. Bruce, Vindicating Bankruptcy Rights, 75 MD. L. REV. 443, 475–77 
(2016). 
2017] RESTORING THE FRESH START 193 
guarantee.19  Therefore, assuming the full effect of Italian Colors, there exists 
somewhat of a spectrum.  At one end are certain laws, such as the antitrust 
laws at issue in Italian Colors, which contain no substantive right—express 
or implied—to bring a class action suit.  At the other end are laws such as the 
NLRA that may provide a substantive right to collectivize through 
litigation,20 despite the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” more 
generally.21 
This Note addresses whether a class-waiving arbitration clause bars our 
former debtor from challenging a discharge injunction violation as a class in 
light of the Italian Colors decision.  Ultimately, it acknowledges that existing 
case law mandates compelling individual arbitration but argues that the 
guarantee of a fresh start for former debtors necessitates a legislative remedy 
to allow former debtors to dispute discharge injunction violations as a class 
in bankruptcy court. 
Part I provides a brief primer of personal bankruptcy law and bankruptcy 
jurisdiction, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),  and the test courts employ 
to resolve conflicts between federal laws—including the Bankruptcy Code—
and the FAA.  Next, Part II explores how courts have treated postdischarge 
claims of debtors seeking to enforce their discharge injunction.  Such 
treatment may have significant consequences that could preclude debtors’ 
ability to dispute discharge injunction violations as a class.  Part III then 
discusses when courts have allowed postdischarge claims to be brought by a 
putative class of debtors rather than by individual debtors.  This discussion is 
particularly important, for if debtors cannot dispute a discharge injunction 
violation as a class, they cannot challenge a class waiver in an arbitration 
clause.  Part IV first applies the current test of the arbitrability of federal 
claims to determine that discharge injunction violations are likely arbitrable.  
It goes on to discuss whether courts should interpret § 524 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which provides for debtors’ discharge injunction, to create a 
substantive right to collective litigation.  It then looks to the effect of Italian 
Colors on bankruptcy courts’ determinations of arbitrability of postdischarge 
claims brought as a class.  Finally, in light of the importance of debtors’ fresh 
start and the need to weed out systemic debt-collection practices, Part V 
argues class-waiving arbitration clauses should not be enforced in a 
postdischarge proceeding under § 524.  Because current case law likely 
mandates the enforcement of such clauses, this Note proposes a legislative 
remedy through the amendment of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
 19. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151–52 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
the NLRA’s guarantee to “engage in other concerted activities” includes the right to adjudicate 
employment claims as a class such that a class waiver in an employment contract was 
unenforceable), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-285); Morris v. Ernst & Young, 
LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2016) (same), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 
16-300). 
 20. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve whether the “concerted activities” 
language in the NLRA does in fact provide for such a substantive right. See Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 
809 (2017) (No. 16-285). 
 21. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
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I.  RECONCILING BANKRUPTCY LAWS WITH 
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
The determination of whether class-waiving arbitration clauses are 
enforceable in postdischarge bankruptcy disputes requires the resolution of a 
potential conflict of federal laws.  One statute—the FAA—requires courts to 
enforce arbitration clauses in all but the rarest of circumstances.22  The other 
statute—the Bankruptcy Code—provides debtors the right to a “fresh start” 
at the closing of their bankruptcy case.23  The Bankruptcy Code also vests 
authority with the bankruptcy courts to resolve a range of bankruptcy matters 
in their own special forum separate from federal district courts.24  Although 
the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly preclude arbitration, many debate 
whether enforcing class-waiving arbitration clauses in cases such as that of 
our former debtor nevertheless violates the Bankruptcy Code.25 
This section provides background for understanding this potential conflict 
of laws.  First, it provides a brief personal bankruptcy primer, including a 
discussion of the discharge injunction, as well as an overview of the 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts.  Next, it outlines a brief history of the FAA.  
Finally, it gives an overview of the “inherent conflict” test courts employ to 
determine whether a federal law conflicts with the FAA such that an 
arbitration clause is unenforceable both generally and in the bankruptcy 
context. 
A.  Personal Bankruptcy Law Primer 
The voiding of debts, or a debt “discharge,” is a central concept of personal 
bankruptcy law in the United States.26  When a bankruptcy court grants an 
individual debtor a discharge, his former creditors may not attempt to collect 
his discharged debts.27  Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a 
discharge “operates as an injunction against the commencement or 
continuation of an action . . . to collect . . . any such debt as a personal 
liability of the debtor.”28 
 
 22. See infra Part I.C. 
 23. See infra Part I.A. 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION 6 (2001); see also John C. McCoid II, 
Discharge:  The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
163, 164 (1996) (describing the discharge as “rank[ing] ahead in importance of all other[] 
[developments] in Anglo-American bankruptcy history”). 
 27. SKEEL, supra note 26, at 6.  Originally, bankruptcy law existed purely to protect 
creditors. See McCoid, supra note 26, at 164–65.  The law’s one-sided focus reflected societal 
scorn of debtors; the first English statute on bankruptcy, enacted in 1543, colorfully depicts 
debtors as conniving thieves who appropriate the wealth of creditors to support immoral, 
lavish lifestyles. See Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and 
the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 21 (1986).  However, by the late 
1600s, public opinion began to change as commentators criticized the draconian bankruptcy 
regime for failing to differentiate between honest and dishonest debtors and for stifling 
economic growth. Id. at 5–7. 
 28. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012).  Courts have held that the discharge injunction applies 
not only to direct attempts to collect discharged debt but also to any action that indirectly 
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The discharge acts as a reward for enduring the emotionally draining 
process of asset distribution to creditors seeking to collect on their debts and 
is a powerful incentive for entering bankruptcy.29  As such, once a court 
closes a debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding, he should be able to find comfort in 
knowing that his discharged debts will not come back to haunt him.30 
Individual debtors may obtain a discharge one of two ways.31  First, they 
may liquidate under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.32  When a debtor 
files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court assumes control of all 
his assets.33  A court appointee, called a “trustee,” then oversees the 
distribution of the debtor’s estate to creditors.34  Even if the liquidated assets 
do not satisfy all of the unpaid debt, the debt is nevertheless discharged unless 
the debt is considered nondischargable under § 523(a).35  Alternatively, the 
debtor may adhere to a “rehabilitation” plan pursuant to Chapter 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.36  Rather than turning over all of his assets to the court, 
the debtor instead retains them and promises to repay his debts over a longer 
period of time.37  Chapter 13 is available to any debtor with a regular 
income.38  The purpose of the discharge under both Chapter 7 and Chapter 
13 is to provide the “honest but unfortunate debtor” a “fresh start” and a 
“completely unencumbered new beginning.”39 
 
pressures a debtor to pay his discharged debt. See, e.g., Green Point Credit, LLC v. McLean 
(In re McLean), 794 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that a creditor had violated 
§ 524 when it filed a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding for debt that had been 
discharged in an earlier proceeding). 
 29. See HOMER DRAKE, JR. & KAREN D. VISSER, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE FOR THE 
GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 6:24 (2017) (noting that discharge is “the principal reason for an 
individual to declare bankruptcy”); Katherine Porter, Life After Debt:  Understanding the 
Credit Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 34 (2010) (describing 
filing for bankruptcy as “an emotionally draining and difficult experience”). 
 30. See Feggins v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Feggins), 535 B.R. 862, 874 (Bankr. M.D. 
Ala. 2015) (“Bankruptcy does not resurrect dead debt.”).  A discharge does not preclude a 
debtor from voluntarily paying his discharged debts.  However, courts will find improper any 
attempts by a creditor to coerce such payments. See DRAKE & VISSER, supra note 29, § 6:24 
nn.2–5 and accompanying text. 
 31. Less commonly, individuals may also obtain a discharge under Chapter 11 by 
reorganizing and paying their debts over time, even though the primary focus of that chapter 
is the reorganization of businesses. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991). 
 32. SKEEL, supra note 26, at 6.  The debtor must be an individual to receive a discharge 
under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2012). 
 33. SKEEL, supra note 26, at 6. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Examples of nondischargable debt are taxes, credit obtained through fraud, and 
domestic support obligations. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). 
 36. SKEEL, supra note 26, at 7.  Chapter 13 debtors do not receive a discharge until they 
certify that they have paid all debts under their repayment plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a); 8 ALAN 
N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1328.02 (16th ed. 2017). 
 37. SKEEL, supra note 26, at 7. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).  Of course, this fresh start provides benefits to debtors.  But early 
proponents of the discharge in American personal bankruptcy law also recognized a great cost 
to society if the weight of one’s debts inhibited one’s positive contribution to society at large. 
See John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure:  A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 428 (2000) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 816 (1840)). 
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Despite bankruptcy law’s debtor-friendly evolution, it has not abandoned 
creditors’ interests.  Bankruptcy still protects creditors by allowing for the 
“prompt and effectual administration and settlement of the estate of all 
bankrupts within a limited period.”40  By allowing creditors to file “proofs of 
claim” with the bankruptcy court, bankruptcy law allows creditors to collect 
their outstanding debts in a centralized and orderly manner.41  Although the 
process does not guarantee them complete recovery, it promotes equitable 
distribution by prioritizing their claims and allocating payments from the 
debtor’s estate on a ratable basis.42 
B.  Bankruptcy Jurisdiction 
The bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction derives from the federal district courts, 
which have “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under [the 
Bankruptcy Code].”43  A bankruptcy “case” is an umbrella under which 
bankruptcy “proceedings” take place following the filing of a petition for 
relief.44  Bankruptcy “proceedings” consist of “contested matters” or 
“adversary proceedings,” including litigation arising after the close of a 
bankruptcy case.45 
Federal district courts also have “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of 
all civil proceedings arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, as well as 
proceedings either “arising in or related to cases under [the Bankruptcy 
Code].”46  A proceeding arises under the Bankruptcy Code if it is premised 
upon substantive bankruptcy rights conferred exclusively by the Bankruptcy 
Code.47  Like a proceeding “arising under” the Code, a proceeding “arising 
in” a bankruptcy case can only arise in the context of bankruptcy, but it is 
typically administrative in nature.48  Proceedings “related to” bankruptcy 
cases often involve matters under state law that “could conceivably have any 
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.”49  Proceedings 
 
 40. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966). 
 41. See 4 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 36, ¶ 501.01. 
 42. See id. 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012).  The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 broadened bankruptcy 
courts’ jurisdiction to include original jurisdiction over most bankruptcy matters. Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668–69.  However, because 
bankruptcy judges are not judges under Article III of the Constitution and do not have life 
tenure, the Supreme Court held the 1978 Act’s jurisdictional grant unconstitutional for vesting 
them with authority reserved only for Article III judges. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).  Congress responded to the Court’s holding in Northern 
Pipeline by vesting original jurisdiction with the federal district courts. Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 333, 
333. 
 44. 2 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 36, ¶ 301.03. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 
 47. See 1 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 36, ¶ 3.01[3][e][i].  
 48. Id. 
 49. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins (In re Pacor, Inc.), 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).  Although 
the Second and Seventh Circuits have adopted a slightly different test for determining “related 
to” jurisdiction, all circuits agree that “bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction over proceedings 
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“arising under” the Code or “arising in” a bankruptcy case constitute “core” 
bankruptcy proceedings in which bankruptcy courts may enter an order or 
judgment.50  Conversely, proceedings “related to” bankruptcy cases are 
“non-core,” and bankruptcy courts may only submit proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to the district court.51 
Although bankruptcy courts do not have original jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy cases—meaning they have no independent jurisdictional 
authority to resolve bankruptcy cases52—§ 157 of the Bankruptcy Code 
permits federal district courts to refer any case under the Code and any of the 
proceedings mentioned in 28 U.S.C. § 133453 to the bankruptcy courts of 
their district.54  All judicial districts have entered local rules or standing 
orders referring all bankruptcy matters to their respective bankruptcy 
courts.55 
C.  The FAA 
In 1924, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act, which protected 
binding arbitration clauses in contracts.56  Section 2 of the FAA, which the 
Supreme Court has called its “primary substantive provision,”57 reads:  “[A] 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”58 
For decades, the Supreme Court interpreted § 2 narrowly.  The 1953 
Supreme Court decision in Wilko v. Swan59 perhaps best represents the 
Court’s earlier FAA jurisprudence.  In Wilko, the Court refused to compel 
arbitration of a dispute arising under the Securities Act of 1933 between 
partners of a securities brokerage firm and their customer despite their prior 
agreement to arbitrate future controversies.60  The Securities Act declared 
void any agreement that would waive compliance with any of the Act’s 
provisions, and the Court held the right to select a judicial forum to be such 
 
that have no effect on the estate of the debtor.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 
n.6 (1995). 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2012). 
 51. See Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy:  A Contractarian 
Analysis, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 510 (2009). 
 52. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 53. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). 
 55. Bruce, supra note 6, at 48.  For an example of a standing order of reference, see In re 
Standing Order of Reference Re:  Title 11, No. 12-MISC-00032 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/StandingOrder_OrderReference_12mc32.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24N4-W8XY]. 
 56. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–14) (2012)). 
 57. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 58. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 59. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  One commentator calls Wilko “the most prominent example” of 
the Supreme Court’s early narrow interpretation of the FAA. Kirgis, supra note 51, at 512. 
 60. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428, 438. 
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a nonwaivable provision.61  The Court reasoned arbitration is an inadequate 
forum to protect securities buyers because the arbitrator’s decision is not 
subject to judicial review and because arbitrators may not receive judicial 
instructions on the law.62 
Despite Wilko’s holding, and notwithstanding scholarship indicating that 
Congress enacted the FAA to promote only commercial arbitration,63 the 
Court’s interpretation of the scope of the FAA has evolved and expanded.64  
By the 1980s, the Court widely promoted arbitration of both federal and state 
law claims, including arbitration of disputes involving clauses in 
standardized contracts of adhesion65 with consumers.66  The Supreme 
Court’s current position is that the FAA was passed primarily to combat 
“judicial hostility to arbitration agreements” in general67 and holds the FAA 
“establishes ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.’”68 
Although arbitration ordinarily involves individual parties, arbitration also 
allows for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights as a class.  In 2003, the Supreme 
Court held that arbitrators may determine whether a contract precluded class 
arbitration, thus impliedly holding class arbitration is permissible.69  In 2009, 
the American Arbitration Association listed 280 class arbitrations;70 by 2015, 
that number increased by almost 50 percent.71  However, with the rise of class 
proceedings came a rise in class waivers,72 inviting the need to resolve the 
validity of such waivers. 
 
 61. Id. at 434–35. 
 62. Id. at 436. 
 63. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:  The Case Against Enforcement 
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 
449, 467 (1996) (concluding that the FAA’s legislative history indicates Congress’s intent to 
exclude noncommercial agreements from its scope); Willy E. Rice, Courts Gone “Irrationally 
Biased” in Favor of the Federal Arbitration Act?—Enforcing Arbitration Provisions in 
Standardized Applications and Marginalizing Consumer-Protection, Antidiscrimination, and 
States’ Contract Laws:  A 1925-2014 Legal and Empirical Analysis, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. 
REV. 405, 445–46 (2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “judicial hostility” explanation 
overlooks critical historical factors that led to the enactment of the FAA, such as Congress’s 
intent to reduce increasing litigation between merchants and encourage the amicable resolution 
of commercial disputes). 
 64. See Kirgis, supra note 51, at 512 (arguing that case law interpreting the FAA has come 
to dominate arbitration law).   
 65. See Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A standard-form 
contract prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position, [usually] a 
consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.”). 
 66. Kirgis, supra note 51, at 513 (describing the Court as “firmly commit[ing] itself to 
arbitrability in virtually every context”). 
 67. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 68. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (quoting Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
 69. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003).  Justice John Paul 
Stevens argued in his concurring opinion that the FAA permitted class arbitration. Id. at 454–
55 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 70. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:  The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2888 (2015).  
 71. Id. at 2888 n.412. 
 72. Id. 
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D.  McMahon and the “Inherent Conflict” Test 
Both bankruptcy courts and Article III courts73 rely on the same Supreme 
Court precedent when determining whether to enforce an arbitration clause.  
However, despite similar origins, the test in bankruptcy courts has evolved 
as similar to but distinct from that of Article III courts.  It has closely tracked 
the Article III test, and bankruptcy courts have at times looked to elements 
of the other test to guide their determinations of enforceability.  Ultimately, 
to reach a conclusion about the effect of recent Supreme Court case law on 
bankruptcy courts’ approach to class-waiving arbitration clauses, it is 
important to look at each test in turn.  This Part will first focus on the test of 
Article III courts and then turn to that employed by bankruptcy courts. 
1.  Article III Courts:  
The “Inherent Conflict” Test and Class Waivers 
Considering the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”74 contractual 
agreements to arbitrate a dispute arising out of federal law are largely 
unassailable.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in Shearson/American 
Express v. McMahon75 that certain claims may be nonarbitrable as a matter 
of federal law.76  That case involved a group of plaintiffs who alleged their 
former brokerage firm violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) and the antifraud provisions of section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.77  In response, the 
brokerage firm filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to its prior 
contracts with the plaintiffs.78  The Court held the plaintiffs’ claims to be 
arbitrable, but in doing so it established a test for determining the arbitrability 
of claims under federal law.79  Accordingly, a party may rebut the 
presumption of arbitrability by showing a “contrary congressional 
command” limiting or prohibiting arbitration waivers in certain contexts.80  
This congressional command should, the Court indicated, “‘be deducible 
from [the statute’s] text or legislative history,’ or from an inherent conflict 
between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”81 
Since McMahon, courts have applied the “inherent conflict” test to a range 
of areas of federal law, from consumer product warranties to employee 
benefit plans and credit repair services.82  Although circuits have arrived at 
 
 73. This Note uses the term “Article III courts” to refer to federal district and circuit courts, 
as well as the Supreme Court, which derive their power from Article III of the Constitution. 
 74. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 75. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 76. Id. at 226–27, 238. 
 77. Id. at 223. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 226–27, 238. 
 80. Id. at 226. 
 81. Id. at 227 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632–37 (1985)). 
 82. E.g., Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying the 
“inherent conflict” test to the Credit Repair Organizations Act); Cunningham v. Fleetwood 
Homes of Ga., Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 613–17 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying the “inherent conflict” 
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various conclusions as to whether certain federal laws inherently conflict 
with the FAA, they have applied similar versions of the test.  For example, 
the Seventh Circuit recently analyzed whether the NLRA allows class 
arbitration, holding the “fundamental right” of employees to collectively 
bargain justified a refusal to enforce the class-waiving arbitration clause at 
issue.83  And although the Eighth Circuit found there to be no such conflict 
between the FAA and the NLRA in a similar case, it nevertheless similarly 
applied the “inherent conflict” test of McMahon to reach its conclusion.84 
Class waivers within arbitration clauses have added a layer of complexity 
to the “inherent conflict” test.  For a time, parties opposing the enforcement 
of class-waiving arbitration clauses looked to two defenses that worked in 
tandem with the Court’s “inherent conflict” test.  The first looked to the 
common law doctrine of unconscionability.85  By finding class waivers 
unconscionable, a court could refuse to enforce the arbitration clause 
pursuant to the exception within § 2 of the FAA.86  For example, the Supreme 
Court of California held that class-waiving arbitration clauses in contracts of 
adhesion are unenforceable under California state law notwithstanding the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.87  However, in 2011, the Supreme Court 
limited the unconscionability defense in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,88 holding the FAA preempts state laws that abrogate the 
enforceability of class-waiving arbitration clauses based on doctrines of 
unconscionability.89 
The second defense to enforceability relied on the “effective vindication” 
doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.90  In contrast to the evaluation of a competing 
substantive federal right under the “inherent conflict” test, the “effective 
vindication” doctrine evaluates the procedural adequacy of arbitration, 
allowing for the enforcement of an arbitration clause only if “the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory right of action in the arbitral 
 
test to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act after a mobile home dealership sought to compel 
arbitration of plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1113–15 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying the “inherent conflict” test to 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). 
 83. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1160 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Allen-Bradley 
Local No. 1111 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 750 (1942)), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 809 (2017) (No. 16-285).  The phrase “inherent conflict” was perhaps inapt in this case.  
The Seventh Circuit held the statute’s preclusion of class waivers to mean any such waivers 
were illegal, thus falling squarely within the FAA’s exception to the presumption of 
enforceability.  To that end, the FAA and the NLRA “work hand in glove.” Id. at 1157. 
 84. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 85. See generally 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4 (rev. ed. 2016). 
 86. As discussed in Part I.C, supra, § 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration clauses are 
enforceable except under “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 87. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 88. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 89. Id. at 341. 
 90. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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forum.”91  In other words, if an arbitration clause acts as a “prospective 
waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” then it is 
unenforceable.92  Under this doctrine, the Court has recognized prohibitively 
high arbitration fees as potential grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitration 
clause even if the Court finds no inherent conflict between the substantive 
statutory right and the FAA.93  A class-waiving arbitration clause may lead 
to such a finding, as an individual plaintiff is unable to spread the fees across 
the class. 
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors took much of the 
wind out of the “effective vindication” doctrine’s sails.94  Although the Court 
recognized the possibility that excessive arbitration fees may act as an 
impermissible waiver of a litigant’s rights, that litigant carries a heavy burden 
of showing the arbitration clause all but completely closes the door to 
adjudication.95  The plaintiffs in that case were unable to meet this burden, 
even though they stood to recover an amount less than the cost of litigating 
individually.96  In so holding, the Italian Colors Court fell back on its 
analysis under McMahon and determined that the federal antitrust law at 
issue contained no “contrary congressional command” requiring the Court to 
reject the class waiver.97  By relying on McMahon to do the heavy lifting not 
only for the analysis of the arbitrability of the claim but also for the validity 
of the class waiver, the Supreme Court all but merged these analyses into 
one. 
2.  Bankruptcy Courts’ “Inherent Conflict” Test 
Bankruptcy courts have also looked to McMahon for guidance and have 
relied on the same “inherent conflict” language as the Article III courts when 
determining the enforceability of arbitration clauses.98  However, the 
 
 91. Id. at 637. 
 92. Id. at 637 n.19. 
 93. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
 94. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); see Resnik, 
supra note 70, at 2886 n.397 (arguing that, in the wake of Concepcion and Italian Colors, 
lower courts have retreated from finding arbitration clauses invalid under the “effective 
vindication” doctrine). 
 95. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
 96. Specifically, the plaintiffs only stood to recover $38,549 individually, while the cost 
of expert analysis necessary to prove their claims was at least several hundred thousand 
dollars. Id. at 2308.   
 97. Id. at 2309. 
 98. Some bankruptcy courts have looked to whether the discharge renders the arbitration 
clause invalid—that is, whether the arbitration clause survives the discharge of the debtor’s 
obligations—before applying the McMahon test. See, e.g., Williams v. Navient Sols., LLC (In 
re Williams), 564 B.R. 770, 775 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017) (“The entry of a chapter 7 discharge 
does not vitiate the effectiveness of an otherwise binding agreement to arbitrate matters 
relating to a claim that may or may not be subject to the discharge.”); Belton v. Ge Capital 
Consumer Lending, Inc. (In re Belton), No. 15-CV-1934 (VLB), 2015 WL 6163083, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2015) (citing Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70–71 (2010)) 
(holding an arbitration clause is severable from the underlying contract and remains in force 
postdischarge).  For the purposes of analysis, this Note assumes the arbitration clause survives 
discharge. 
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“inherent conflict” test in bankruptcy courts has evolved with some 
distinctions. 
To begin, the Supreme Court’s unequivocal message to enforce arbitration 
clauses in all but the rarest of circumstances creates a unique tension in 
bankruptcy courts.99  Much of this tension can be explained by the 
jurisdictional evolution of the bankruptcy courts.  Under the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, the scope of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction was limited, and many 
bankruptcy matters were resolved in state courts.100  In 1973, the 
congressionally authorized National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
proposed expanding the scope of matters over which bankruptcy courts had 
jurisdiction.101  Although Congress did not incorporate all of the 
commission’s recommendations into the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,102 the 
Code’s current jurisdictional structure reflects a greater centralization of 
bankruptcy matters in bankruptcy court.103  Therefore, unlike federal district 
courts, the centralizing pull of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction bears upon the 
question of whether to allow resolution of a claim in another forum such as 
arbitration. 
A critical distinguishing attribute of the “inherent conflict” test in 
bankruptcy is the deference accorded to the bankruptcy courts’ determination 
of arbitrability.104  Courts have long agreed that arbitration clauses are 
enforceable when a “non-core” claim is at issue.105  Because a bankruptcy 
court lacks jurisdiction to decide “non-core” claims on their merits, there 
cannot be a countervailing interest for the bankruptcy court, rather than an 
arbitrator, to resolve the matter.  In this regard, the deference to a 
determination of arbitrability of “non-core” claims is similar to that accorded 
to federal district courts; on an appeal of a district court’s determination of 
arbitrability in a nonbankruptcy setting, the court reviews the decision de 
novo.106  However, at least in the context of the arbitrability of “core” 
 
 99. See Kirgis, supra note 51, at 516 (arguing that the determination of claims’ 
arbitrability “create[s] a dilemma for [bankruptcy] judges who have been conditioned to 
enforce arbitration clauses without a second thought, but who are also highly sensitive to the 
centralizing pull of the bankruptcy process”). 
 100. SKEEL, supra note 26, at 147.  Bankruptcy courts had broader “summary” jurisdiction 
over the debtor’s property but a more limited “plenary” jurisdiction over other matters.  
Accordingly, state courts often resolved matters not directly implicating the debtor’s property, 
such as claims against the debtor for preference or for alleged fraudulent transfer of the 
debtor’s assets to shelter them against collection. Id. 
 101. Id. at 139, 141. 
 102. Id. at 141. 
 103. For a discussion of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see supra Part I.B. 
 104. However, some have argued that the Court did not intend for McMahon to help courts 
determine which forum is best for hearing a case that may be arbitrated but rather merely to 
resolve the question of whether a federal claim is arbitrable. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 51, 
at 523–24 (arguing that the Court did not intend for McMahon to help courts determine which 
forum is best for hearing a case that may be arbitrated but rather to merely resolve whether a 
federal claim was arbitrable). 
 105. Id. at 517. 
 106. See, e.g., Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub 
nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp.-Ala., 178 F.3d 1149, 1152 (11th Cir. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 531 U.S. 79 
(2000). 
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claims,107 which do not dispose of the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement, most circuits employ an abuse of discretion standard after 
reviewing de novo whether the bankruptcy court had discretion.108 
Although most circuits defer to bankruptcy courts’ decisions of 
arbitrability in “core” proceedings, they are divided regarding the 
circumstances under which to defer.  After holding that neither the 
Bankruptcy Code’s text nor its legislative history evinced a congressional 
intent to preclude arbitration of “core” claims, the Fifth Circuit in In re 
National Gypsum Co.109 employed a two-part inquiry under McMahon’s 
“inherent conflict” test.110  First, the court looked to the “underlying nature 
of the proceeding” to determine “whether [the claim] derives exclusively 
from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”111  It was careful to distinguish 
“federal rights conferred by the Bankruptcy Code” from the jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy courts as the first step of its “inherent conflict” test.112  Second, 
it held the bankruptcy court “retains significant discretion to assess whether 
arbitration would be consistent with the purpose of the Code” if the claim at 
issue concerns rights derived exclusively from the Bankruptcy Code.113  
Finally, it held such purposes to include “the goal of centralized resolution of 
purely bankruptcy issues, the need to protect creditors and reorganizing 
debtors from piecemeal litigation, and the undisputed power of a bankruptcy 
court to enforce its own orders.”114 
The Third Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach, holding that a 
bankruptcy court has no discretion to assess whether arbitration is consistent 
with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code when the debtor “has failed to raise 
any statutory claims that were created by the Bankruptcy Code.”115  
Similarly, when evaluating the arbitrability of a “core” claim, the Ninth 
Circuit in In re Thorpe Insulation Co.116 first noted that the underlying claim 
originated in the Bankruptcy Code, then held that the bankruptcy court had 
discretion to deny arbitration in light of the policies implicated by the 
underlying claim.117 
 
 107. To reiterate, “core” claims include claims “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code as 
well as claims “arising in” a bankruptcy case. See supra Part I.B. 
 108. For a discussion of the circuit courts’ approaches to the “inherent conflict” test in 
bankruptcy, see infra notes 109–24 and accompanying text. 
 109. 118 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 110. Id. at 1067. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1068–69 (noting that the Court in McMahon was concerned primarily with the 
purposes of and rights conferred by a particular federal statute, rather than the jurisdiction of 
federal courts).  Accordingly, under the Fifth Circuit’s “inherent conflict” test, whether a 
“core” claim “arises under” or “arises in” the Bankruptcy Code has no direct bearing on its 
arbitrability. 
 113. Id. at 1069. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 116. 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 117. Id. at 1022.  Unlike the approach of the Fifth Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit 
appears to rely on the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code to find an inherent conflict sufficient 
to give the bankruptcy court discretion, notwithstanding whether the claim itself derives 
exclusively from the Bankruptcy Code. See id. 
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By contrast, the Second and Fourth Circuits only undertake the policy-
based second inquiry of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits’ test118 and 
decline to look to whether a claim “derives exclusively from the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code.”119  By excluding the inquiry of whether the claim 
itself is a “statutory claim[] . . . created by the Bankruptcy Code,”120 the 
potential to find a conflict is arguably greater in these circuits.  For example, 
in MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill,121 the Second Circuit established a 
case-by-case inquiry that looks to whether arbitration of the claim would 
“seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.”122  The Fourth 
Circuit also adopted a purpose-driven approach in In re White Mountain 
Mining Co.123 when it analyzed whether arbitration conflicted with the 
purposes of certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and ultimately 
deferred to the bankruptcy court’s decision.124 
Like the “inherent conflict” test employed by Article III courts, the 
introduction of class-waiving clauses into the analysis adds complexity.  
However, few courts have analyzed class waivers under the “inherent 
conflict” test in bankruptcy.125  The Second Circuit’s decision in Hill is one 
such example.  Rather than treat the class-waiving question as separate from 
that of the arbitrability of the claim, the Second Circuit held the plaintiff’s 
choice to file as a putative class was evidence that her claim “lack[ed] the 
direct connection to her own bankruptcy case” necessary to show arbitration 
would “seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.”126 
In addition, two recent cases in the Southern District of New York relied 
on Hill to review bankruptcy decisions refusing to compel arbitration of class 
claims, although the courts disagreed over its holding.  In one of these 
decisions, In re Anderson,127 the court held the enforceability of the class 
waiver to be independent of the question of arbitrability, thereby declining to 
review the bankruptcy court’s decision relating to the class waiver’s 
 
 118. Indeed, in MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2006), the 
Second Circuit relied explicitly on the factors of the second prong articulated by the Fifth 
Circuit in In re National Gypsum Co. 
 119. In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d at 1067. 
 120. In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 231. 
 121. 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 122. Id. at 109.  In finding that arbitration would “not seriously jeopardize the objectives 
of the Bankruptcy Code,” the court gave three reasons: 
(1) [The debtor’s] estate has now been fully administered and her debts have been 
discharged, so she no longer requires protection of the automatic stay and resolution 
of the claim would have no effect on her bankruptcy estate; (2) as a purported class 
action, [the debtor’s] claims lack the direct connection to her own bankruptcy case 
that would weigh in favor of refusing to compel arbitration; and (3) a stay is not so 
closely related to an injunction that the bankruptcy court is uniquely able to interpret 
and enforce its provisions. 
Id. 
 123. 403 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 124. Id. at 170–71. 
 125. See Bruce, supra note 18, at 475–76. 
 126. Hill, 436 F.3d at 109. 
 127. 550 B.R. 228 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 16-2496 (2d Cir. July 13, 2016). 
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unenforceability.128  In the other decision, In re Belton,129 the court first 
relied on Hill in holding that the class of plaintiffs contributed to the finding 
that arbitration did not jeopardize the Bankruptcy Code.130  The court then 
relied on Italian Colors, holding individual arbitration of the debtors’ claim 
would not eliminate “the[ir] right to pursue” a remedy.131 
Bankruptcy courts’ approach to the “inherent conflict” test and the circuits’ 
different analyses of class waivers together provide the framework for 
analyzing the enforceability of class-waiving arbitration clauses in a 
postdischarge dispute. 
II.  ENFORCING DISCHARGE INJUNCTIONS 
To determine the enforceability of class-waiving arbitration clauses, it is 
necessary to determine whether a violation of § 524 is actionable—that is, 
whether the Bankruptcy Code allows our former debtor to bring a claim at 
all.  It is axiomatic that there can be no inherent conflict between the FAA 
and the Bankruptcy Code if he has no federal right to vindicate. 
Fortunately for our former debtor, courts generally agree that he has 
avenues for recourse.  Just what jurisdictional grant allows bankruptcy courts 
to render a judgment, however, is disputed.  Courts also disagree about how 
to enforce a discharge injunction violation. 
While an individual debtor-plaintiff may be indifferent to the court’s 
interpretation of its jurisdiction or its method of enforcement, the treatment 
of § 524 has more significant consequences for a class of debtors.  Although 
this Note does not seek to resolve either question, a preliminary discussion 
of the varying approaches to jurisdiction and enforcement is critical to 
identifying those methods that ultimately allow for class proceedings.  The 
following section discusses in greater detail the ways in which courts treat 
matters involving violations of § 524. 
A.  The Jurisdictional Authority of Bankruptcy Courts to 
Enforce Discharge Injunctions Under § 524 
It is uncontroverted that the violation of a discharge injunction implicates 
a bankruptcy court’s “core” jurisdiction, which allows bankruptcy judges to 
render a final judgment.132  Nevertheless, courts disagree about the source of 
their jurisdiction over postdischarge disputes under § 524.  Some courts 
interpret § 524 to grant substantive rights to a debtor such that a discharge 
injunction dispute “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code.133  Other courts hold 
 
 128. Id. at 235. 
 129. No. 15-CV-1934 (VLB), 2015 WL 6163083 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2015). 
 130. Id. at *8. 
 131. Id. at *9 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 
(2013)). 
 132. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) 
(“[R]estructuring of debtor-creditor relations . . . is at the core of the federal bankruptcy 
power.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. NGC Settlement Tr. & Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp. 
(In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 118 F.3d 1056, 1063–64 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 524 confers 
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more obliquely that any violation of the Bankruptcy Code constitutes a 
“core” proceeding, the remedy for which, at least impliedly, “arises under” 
the Code.134  Alternatively, some courts hold the bankruptcy court that issued 
an injunction has the inherent authority to render final judgment when a party 
has violated it.135 
The interpretation of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in this context has a 
significant impact on the opportunity for our former debtor to bring his 
postdischarge claim on behalf of a class.  If, on the one hand, a court adopts 
the view that a debtor may only seek relief on an individual basis from the 
bankruptcy court that discharged his debts, the court forecloses his ability to 
seek relief as part of a class, regardless of any class-waiving arbitration 
clauses.  On the other hand, if a court interprets its jurisdiction to originate in 
a substantive right within the Bankruptcy Code rather than an individual 
debtor’s bankruptcy case, a debtor may be able to proceed as a class. 
B.  Approaches to Enforcing Discharge Injunctions Under § 524 
The treatment of the discharge injunction under § 524 is particularly 
important to answering the ultimate question of the enforceability of class-
waiving arbitration clauses, as it may ultimately frame how courts apply their 
“inherent conflict” test.  Yet courts disagree over exactly how to enforce a 
discharge injunction.  A minority of courts have held that § 524 creates an 
implied right of action, allowing a debtor to file a complaint in any federal 
district court and implying the right to receive a trial by jury.136  Without 
explicitly disagreeing that § 524 creates a private right of action to remedy 
violations of this injunction, other courts hold that § 524 is only enforceable 
through § 105, which grants the bankruptcy court that issued the injunction 
flexibility in enforcing the Bankruptcy Code.137  In between are both broad 
and narrow interpretations of debtors’ substantive rights and the extent of the 
bankruptcy courts’ contempt powers.  This section analyzes these various 
approaches by looking to three topics of dispute:  (1) the nature of the rights 
§ 524 confers on debtors, (2) the nature of the rights § 105 confers on debtors, 
and (3) the inherent contempt powers of the bankruptcy courts. 
1.  Debtors’ Rights Under § 524 
Both federal district courts and bankruptcy courts begin their analysis of 
§ 524 violations by determining whether § 524 creates a private right of 
 
a substantive right to the discharged debtor, the dispute over which arises under the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
 134. See, e.g., Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 505–06 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that claims alleging a violation of the Bankruptcy Code constitute “core” 
proceedings). 
 135. See, e.g., Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that a bankruptcy court, much like a federal district court, “possesses the inherent power to 
sanction contempt of its orders”). 
 136. See Molloy v. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., 247 B.R. 804, 819 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 137. Barrientos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 633 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011); Cox v. 
Zale Del., Inc., 239 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). 
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action.138  A majority of the courts have held § 524 does not provide for a 
private right of action.139  This determination may be dispositive of a court’s 
decision to permit debtor class actions, as a debtor who cannot successfully 
bring a claim as an individual cannot bring the claim as a class. 
For example, in Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,140 the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a debtor’s claim for relief under 
§ 524 holding that a private right of action does not exist under that 
section.141  The plaintiffs, who were former debtors, brought a class action 
lawsuit in federal district court against defendant Ford Motor Credit 
Company for attempting to collect discharged debt in violation of § 524.142  
The district court did not grant class certification and dismissed the complaint 
without leave to amend.143  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that “the 
traditional remedy for violation of an injunction lies in contempt proceedings, 
not in a lawsuit such as this one.”144  The court was silent as to whether 
bankruptcy courts may preside over contempt proceedings involving a class 
of debtors.145  At the very least, its decision foreclosed the possibility of class 
proceedings as an enforcement mechanism for § 524 in federal district court. 
The reasoning of the Sixth Circuit relies in large part on the language of 
§ 524(a)(2), which provides that a discharge “operates as an injunction,” but 
is otherwise silent as to any remedies.146  This language is comparable to that 
of the Bankruptcy Code’s § 362, which governs automatic stays.147  Like a 
discharge, an automatic stay prevents creditors from seeking to collect debts 
outside the bankruptcy process.148  Creditors seeking repayment must file 
“proofs of claim” with the bankruptcy court, which notify the court of the 
amount of money the debtor owes to them.149  When a debtor emerges from 
bankruptcy, the stay is lifted and the discharge takes its place.150 
Despite similar functions, the prescribed remedies for violating § 524 and 
§ 362 differ.  While § 362 expressly provides for a private right of action, 
§ 524 is silent to any such right.  Section 362(k)(1) allows any “individual 
injured by any willful violation of a stay” to “recover actual damages, 
including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, [to] 
 
 138. A statute creates a private right of action when it allows an individual to “sue in a 
personal capacity to enforce a legal claim.” Private Right of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014).  Private rights of action may be “express” or “implied.” See 33 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  JUDICIAL REVIEW 
§ 8324 (2006). 
 139. See, e.g., Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 666 Fed. App’x 766, 774–75 (11th Cir. 2016); 
Walls, 276 F.3d at 509; Cox, 239 F.3d at 917; Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 
422–23 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 140. 233 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 141. Id. at 422–23. 
 142. Id. at 420. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 421. 
 145. Id. 
 146. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012). 
 147. Id. § 362 (stating that a petition of bankruptcy “operates as a stay”). 
 148. Id. § 362(a). 
 149. 4 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 36, ¶ 501.01. 
 150. See id.  
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recover punitive damages.”151  Section 524 goes no further than stating that 
a discharge “operates as an injunction.”152  Some courts have pointed to this 
language to conclude that Congress did not intend for § 524 to provide a 
private right of action.153 
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that Congress did not 
amend § 524 when it added a subsection to § 362 providing for a private right 
of action as part of Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984.154  Some have argued that, by adding this provision to the automatic 
stay provision but not to § 524, Congress did not intend § 524 to provide a 
similar remedy.155 
Despite the absence of any language providing an express private right of 
action, some courts and commentators have argued that such a right exists.  
One argument relies on an expansive reading of the discharge injunction as a 
complete bar to any attempts by creditors to collect discharged debt, whether 
in or out of court.156  This expansive reading is supported by Congress’s 
apparent intent “to give complete effect to the discharge and to eliminate any 
doubt concerning the effect of the discharge as a total prohibition on debt 
collection efforts.”157  Another argument looks to the policies furthered by 
the discharge injunction, such as the need to protect debtors from harassment 
by creditors, as evidence of legislative intent to create a private right of 
action.158 
 
 151. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). 
 152. Id. § 524(a)(2). 
 153. See Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 508–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that § 362 is evidence that “Congress certainly knows how to create a private right of action 
when it wants to”); Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that “[t]he contrast [between §§ 362 and 524] is instructive” in finding no right of 
action in § 524). 
 154. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
§ 304, 98 Stat. 333, 352 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)).  Congress amended § 362 to provide 
for such a right following criticism of the use of the court’s contempt power to remedy 
violations of the automatic stay. See Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 99-CV-6389 
(REC/SMS), 2000 WL 1225788, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2000). 
 155. See Walls, 276 F.3d at 509 (“Had Congress meant to create a private right of action 
for violations of § 524, it could easily have done so; that it did not is a strong [indication] that 
it did not intend any such remedy.”); Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 422 (concluding Congress’s failure 
to amend § 524 when it amended § 362 to provide for a private right of action evinced an 
intent not to provide a private right of action under § 524); Cohen v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., 
Inc., No. 8:15-CV-01922-T27-EAJ, 2016 WL 3748659, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2016) 
(holding that Congress acted intentionally when amending § 362 to provide for a private right 
of action but did not similarly amend § 524); cf. Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 811 
F.3d 86, 92 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (comparing the absence of an express right of action in § 524 
with the language of § 362(k), but declining to rule on an implied right of action). 
 156. Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Remedying Violations of the Discharge Injunction Under 
Bankruptcy Code § 524, Federal Non-Bankruptcy Law, and State Law Comports with 
Congressional Intent, Federalism, and Supreme Court Jurisprudence for Identifying the 
Existence of an Implied Right of Action, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 77, 105 (2003). 
 157. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 365 (1977)). 
 158. See Rogers v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 233 B.R. 98, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
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However, for all the attention courts give the private-right-of-action 
question, it has little practical impact on the outcome of the dispute.159  
Whether a federal statute creates a private right of action is incredibly 
important for Article III courts; absent a private right of action, those federal 
courts likely lack federal question jurisdiction to grant relief.160  Yet a § 524 
dispute’s “core” nature—at least when a debtor does not seek to enforce his 
discharge injunction as a class161—resolves the jurisdictional question for 
bankruptcy courts.162 
The absence of a private right of action might cause federal district courts 
to dismiss a debtor’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which they can 
grant relief, but that does not leave the debtor without recourse.  Some courts 
dismiss the claim without prejudice, preserving the debtor’s ability to refile 
in bankruptcy court.163  Other courts refer the matter to the bankruptcy court 
pursuant to its district’s local rule or standing order and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1412, which allows courts to transfer cases to other venues “in the interest 
of justice or for the convenience of the parties.”164  Nevertheless, the absence 
of any prescribed remedy invites interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code to 
determine how it gives the discharge injunction teeth. 
2.  Section 105 as an Enforcement Mechanism 
Despite holding that § 524 does not create a private right of action, many 
courts have concluded that the debtor may have other avenues of recourse.  
These courts rely on § 105, which allows the bankruptcy court165 to “issue 
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions of this title,” and “mak[e] any determination necessary or 
appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an 
abuse of process.”166  The discharge injunction of § 524 is arguably a 
 
 159. See Transcript of Status Conference; Pre-Trial Conference; Motion to Dismiss 
Adversary Proceeding, to Compel Arbitration, to Strike Class Allegations, to Stay Proceedings 
at 45, Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A., No. 15-08214 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015) 
(calling the issue of a private right of action a “red herring”). 
 160. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986) (holding 
that the absence of a congressionally prescribed remedy for violation of a federal statute “is 
tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute 
as an element of a state right of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question 
jurisdiction”). 
 161. See infra Part III.C (discussing how some courts view class action proceedings as 
“non-core” proceedings). 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
 163. See Cox v. Zale Del., Inc., 242 B.R. 444, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 910 (7th 
Cir. 2001).   
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012); see also Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 666 Fed. App’x 766, 
775 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 165. Courts debate whether § 105 similarly grants federal district courts this authority. 
Compare Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 446 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A] district 
court sitting in bankruptcy is similarly authorized to invoke its equitable powers under § 105 
when necessary to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”), with Pertuso v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a federal district court cannot 
invoke § 105 to remedy a discharge violation). 
 166. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
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provision of the Bankruptcy Code, and the collection of discharged debt is 
certainly an abuse of process.167  Indeed, many courts have relied on § 105 
to hold contempt proceedings and sanction offenders,168 offer compensatory 
damages,169 grant attorney’s fees,170 and sometimes award punitive 
damages.171 
Holding that § 524 is only remediable through contempt proceedings under 
§ 105 is not necessarily fatal to classes of debtors.  Although generally only 
the court that issued an injunction may hold a violator in contempt,172 some 
courts have presided over contempt proceedings involving classes of 
debtors.173 
3.  Inherent Contempt Authority 
Finally, some courts hold that bankruptcy courts possess an inherent 
authority to hold contempt proceedings.174  Reliance on this theory of the 
bankruptcy courts’ power effectively leads to the same result reached by 
those courts that rely on § 105 to enforce § 524, although 524’s inherent 
authority is “inherent to all courts, while [§ 105’s authority] is rooted in 
statute.”175  One interpretation of a court’s inherent contempt authority is that 
a bankruptcy court has the inherent authority to enforce its own orders.176  
Another more expansive interpretation holds that bankruptcy courts have the 
inherent authority to enforce provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless 
of the issuing court.177  It follows from this view that bankruptcy courts’ 
inherent authority may allow debtors to seek relief in jurisdictions other than 
the court in which they received their discharge injunction.178  This 
interpretation may provide one avenue for debtors to seek relief as a 
nationwide class. 
 
 167. See Bessette, 230 F.3d at 445 (holding that a bankruptcy court may invoke § 105 to 
enforce § 524). 
 168. See, e.g., Hardy v. United States ex rel. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 
1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 169. See, e.g., Otero v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Otero), 498 B.R. 313, 318, 321–
22 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013) (awarding an amount to a debtor equal to the discharged debt a 
creditor coerced the debtor into paying). 
 170. See, e.g., Watkins v. Guardian Loan Co. (In re Watkins), 240 B.R. 668, 683 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 171. See, e.g., Nibbelink v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Nibbelink), 403 B.R. 113, 121–
22 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 172. See Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 (1998). 
 173. See infra Part III.C. 
 174. See, e.g., In re Biery, 543 B.R. 267, 298–99 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2015); Cano v. GMAC 
Mortg. Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 538 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Perviz, 302 B.R. 
357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003). 
 175. See In re Cano, 410 B.R. at 538. 
 176. See Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that 
a bankruptcy court has inherent contempt powers in addition to its statutory contempt powers 
under § 105); Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C. v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (“Bankruptcy courts, like Article III courts, enjoy inherent power to sanction parties 
for improper conduct.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp. (In re Aiello), 231 B.R. 693, 702 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1999), aff’d, 257 B.R. 245 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 178. See id. 
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III.  COMBATTING § 524 VIOLATIONS AS A CLASS OF DEBTORS 
As discussed in the previous section, a court cannot reach the question of 
a class-waiving arbitration clauses’ enforceability unless the debtor is 
permitted, at the very least, to seek relief individually.  Similarly, a court 
cannot reach this question unless the Bankruptcy Code permits a class of 
debtors in this context. 
This Part discusses classes of debtors in bankruptcy.  It explores the 
different reasons that a debtor may seek relief as a class, such as cost 
efficiency and the greater availability of legal services.  Next, it concludes 
the Bankruptcy Code does not necessarily preclude a debtor from seeking 
relief as a class in contested matters such as postdischarge disputes.  Finally, 
it explores the different approaches of bankruptcy courts when deciding 
whether to allow for a debtor to contest a discharge injunction violation as 
part of a class.  Like the previous Parts, this Part does not seek to resolve 
which approach is correct.  Rather, it merely explains the possible 
justifications for allowing or denying debtor classes.  This is essential to 
understanding how courts may apply the “inherent conflict” test in the 
context of discharge injunction violations. 
A.  Reasons Debtors May Want to Dispute 
Discharge Injunction Violations as a Class 
There are many practical reasons why a debtor may want to dispute 
postdischarge misconduct as a class.  Most importantly, such class actions 
are a powerful means to uncover systemic violations of discharge 
injunctions.179  Centralizing multiple claims against one creditor may help 
the court to discover abusive patterns and practices.180  In addition, litigating 
as a class allows debtor-plaintiffs to realize economies of scale if the cost of 
disputing a creditor’s conduct outweighs the relatively small amount of a 
single debtor’s damages.181  The presiding bankruptcy court also benefits 
from economies of scale by not having to hold multiple proceedings 
involving the same creditor’s misconduct.182 
Another reason specific to § 524 for forming debtor classes is that 
reopening one’s bankruptcy case may not always be easy.  It is likely that a 
debtor’s bankruptcy attorney no longer represents him, leading him to 
 
 179. See In re Biery, No. 10-23338, 2014 WL 1431947, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Apr. 14, 
2014) (“First and most importantly, class procedures would enhance the chance that the 
potential class members’ contempt claims are adjudicated and any systemic violation of 
discharges on Respondents’ part is discovered.”). 
 180. In re Melendez, 224 B.R. 252, 264 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (discerning a creditor’s 
“disturbing pattern” of interference with debtors’ ability to receive a “fresh start”). 
 181. See, e.g., Brannan v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (In re Brannan), 485 B.R. 443, 
460 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2013) (certifying class of debtors); Montano v. First Light Fed. Credit 
Union (In re Montano), 398 B.R. 47, 58–59 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2008) (same). 
 182. Cf. In re Melendez, 224 B.R. at 271 (consolidating evidentiary hearings of numerous 
debtors alleging similar claims against the same creditor).  
212 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
reengage counsel to proceed with his motion to the court.183  A related reason 
is that, absent representation, the debtor may not realize the creditor’s actions 
violate his discharge rights under § 524.184  A class action will protect such 
debtors.  Additionally, attorneys, who are often paid a contingent fee, have 
little incentive to pursue the claim if the potential compensatory damages are 
nominal.185 
B.  Class Actions in the Bankruptcy Code 
The idea of a class of debtors perhaps seems antithetical to the notion of 
bankruptcy.  After all, one of bankruptcy’s primary functions is to equitably 
allocate the estate of an individual debtor to his creditors.186  Under this view 
of bankruptcy, the court derives its authority to preside over a debtor’s 
bankruptcy proceedings through its jurisdiction in rem—that is, over the 
property of a debtor.187  If a court may exercise only in rem jurisdiction over 
a debtor’s estate, then it cannot be that debtors may bring a proceeding as a 
putative class when a particular bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction 
over the equitable distribution of the estates of other class members. 
This jurisdiction is different from in personam jurisdiction, which allows 
the court to exercise jurisdiction over individuals.188  Under this view of the 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, class actions of creditors are not antithetical 
to the bankruptcy process.  Bankruptcy proceedings often involve multiple 
creditors seeking to recover from the same debtor.189  Therefore, creditors 
may file as a class. 
Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly prohibit debtors 
from forming a class in a dispute against a common creditor.  The Bankruptcy 
Code incorporates Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through 
Rule 7023 to allow for class actions in “adversary proceedings.”190  
Importantly, the Bankruptcy Code contains no express language limiting the 
right to form a class to creditors.191  Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules governs 
adversary proceedings, which are distinct from “contested matters” governed 
 
 183. In re Biery, 2014 WL 1431947, at *6 (“By that point, his relationship with his 
bankruptcy counsel will have concluded, and he will need to re-engage counsel to file a 
contempt motion.”). 
 184. Id. (“Lacking counsel, he may not realize that a prohibited collection attempt violates 
his discharge and may believe that he is obligated to pay an otherwise discharged debt.”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 187. See In Rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 188. See In Personam, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 189. See Bruce, supra note 6, at 42–43. 
 190. 11 U.S.C. § 7023 (2012). 
 191. See Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Wilborn), 609 F.3d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 
2010) (“[I]f bankruptcy court jurisdiction is not permitted over a class action of debtors, Rule 
7023 is virtually read out of the rules.  This would ascribe to Congress the intent to 
categorically foreclose multi-debtor class actions arising under the Bankruptcy Code without 
a clear indication of such intent.”). 
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by Part IX of the Bankruptcy Rules.192  In short, adversary proceedings are 
lawsuits within a particular bankruptcy case.193 
If, as a majority of courts hold, a bankruptcy court must treat a 
postdischarge dispute under § 524 as remediable through contempt 
proceedings rather than through a standalone lawsuit,194 then the dispute 
could not be an adversary proceeding.  Rule 7001 provides an exclusive list 
of matters considered adversary proceedings under the Code.195  Disputes not 
contained in this list are considered contested matters, which may only be 
initiated by motion.196  Rule 9020 expressly provides that contested matters 
include contempt proceedings.197 
The characterization of a postdischarge dispute under § 524 as a contested 
matter does not foreclose debtors’ ability to seek relief as a class.  However, 
Rule 9014 states that several of the rules applicable to adversary proceedings 
“shall apply” in contested matters.198  Although Rule 7023 is not named in 
this list, courts have nevertheless read Rule 9014 to incorporate Rule 7023.199 
Rule 9014 specifically states that certain discovery rules incorporated into 
adversary proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 7026 “shall not apply” in 
contested matters.200  If the list in Rule 9014 were meant to be exclusive, it 
would have been superfluous to include this express limitation.  The 
permissive wording in Rule 9014 also supports this reading.  It provides that 
certain rules shall apply “unless the court directs otherwise”201 and that “[t]he 
court may at any stage in a particular matter direct that one or more of the 
other rules in Part VII shall apply.”202  The upshot is that a bankruptcy court 
has the discretionary authority to apply Rule 7023 in contested matters and 
allow a class action in such proceedings.203  Indeed, at least five circuits have 
read Rule 9014 to incorporate Rule 7023 into contested matters.204 
 
 192. FED. R. BANKR. P. pts. VII, IX. 
 193. 10 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 36, ¶ 7001.01. 
 194. See supra Part II.B. 
 195. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. 
 196. See Barrientos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 633 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[C]ontempt proceedings for a violation of § 524 must be initiated by motion in the 
bankruptcy case under Rule 9014 and not by adversary proceeding.”). 
 197. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020. 
 198. Id. 9014(c). 
 199. See, e.g., In re Biery, No. 10-23338, 2014 WL 1431947, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Apr. 
14, 2014). 
 200. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(c). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.; see also In re Biery, 2014 WL 1431947, at *3 (noting that bankruptcy courts have 
greater discretion than federal district courts to allow classes of debtors in contempt 
proceedings in light of Rule 9014).  
 203. See In re Biery, 2014 WL 1431947, at *4. 
 204. See Gentry v. Siegel, 668 F.3d 83, 89–91 (4th Cir. 2012) (allowing creditors to file 
proofs of claim as a class pursuant to Rules 7023 and 9014); Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 
F.2d 1462, 1469–70 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Certified Class in the Charter Sec. Litig. v. Charter 
Co. (In re Charter Co.), 876 F.2d 866, 867 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); In re Am. Reserve Corp., 
840 F.2d 487, 488 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Birting Fisheries, Inc. v. Lane (In re Birting 
Fisheries, Inc.), 178 B.R. 849, 851 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (same), aff’d, 92 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
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C.  Allowing Debtors to Proceed as a Class 
Just as it would be fruitless to challenge the class-waiving arbitration 
clause if our former debtor has no legal remedy under § 524,205 our former 
debtor would also be unable to challenge it if he cannot dispute a discharge 
injunction violation as part of class.  Courts disagree over a debtor’s ability 
to bring a claim as a class.  Those courts that would allow our former debtor 
to bring his claim as a class may permit a nationwide class or may limit the 
class to debtors within the same federal district.  Conversely, some courts 
may hold that they have no jurisdiction to settle postdischarge disputes of 
debtors with no connection to our former debtor’s estate.  The following 
discussion summarizes the different treatment of classes of debtors in this 
context.206 
1.  Nationwide Classes of Debtors 
Some courts have allowed for nationwide classes of debtors by relying on 
the contempt power of the courts.207  For example, the First Circuit held that 
debtors can maintain a class to seek enforcement of a § 524 discharge 
injunction in either bankruptcy court or district court.208  It first reasoned that 
both the district court and bankruptcy court may rely on their inherent 
contempt powers as well as their statutory contempt power under § 105 to 
enforce § 524.209  Next, it held that § 524 creates a “statutory injunction” 
applicable to all debtors, which differs from a court-ordered injunction 
applicable only to a simple debtor that is “individually crafted by the 
bankruptcy judge, and in which that judge’s insights and thought processes 
may be of particular significance.”210  Accordingly, the First Circuit held that 
 
 205. See supra Part II.B. 
 206. This section limits its discussion to the ability for debtors to dispute discharge 
injunction violations as a putative class.  It is important to note that classes of debtors may 
find it difficult to meet the certification requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in contesting systemic 
discharge injunction violations.  It may be that the resolution of the debtors’ claims would 
require the court to conduct too many individualized inquiries, such that the plaintiffs fail to 
meet the predominance and superiority requirements, and possibly even the commonality 
requirement. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (holding that 
commonality requires a contention “that it is capable of classwide resolution,” and that 
plaintiffs cannot simply allege they “have all suffered a violation of the same provision of 
law”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624–25 (1997) (holding that a class of 
plaintiffs who were or would someday be injured by asbestos exposure did not satisfy the 
predominance requirement, as there was significant variation in the manner of their exposure 
and the types of their injuries).  A more complete discussion of class certification, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
 207. See Bruce, supra note 6, at 63–66 (discussing “contempt power” cases that look to the 
limits of judicial authority rather than to their basis for subject matter jurisdiction). 
 208. Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 446; see also Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Walls), 262 B.R. 519, 528 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that the discharge injunction is a “Code created, statutory 
injunction[]” that “does not depend on individual orders for injunctive relief fashioned by 
individual bankruptcy judges”); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Class Actions for 
Post-Petition Wrongs:  National Relief Against National Creditors, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
14, 46 (2003) (arguing the characterization of § 524 as an “‘injunction’ is a legal fiction, a 
2017] RESTORING THE FRESH START 215 
enforcement of the discharge injunction of § 524 need not be confined to the 
issuing tribunal.211  Finally, the First Circuit held that § 7023 allowed the 
debtors to seek relief in contempt proceedings as a class in either district or 
bankruptcy court.212 
Courts have also relied on their § 1334 subject matter jurisdiction to allow 
for a nationwide class of debtors.213  Some have interpreted § 1334(b), which 
provides for bankruptcy courts’ subject matter jurisdiction,214 to allow a 
bankruptcy court to preside over any bankruptcy action, regardless of the 
court in which it originated.215  Other courts have adopted an expansive view 
of § 1334(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which grants the district court in which 
a bankruptcy case is filed “exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all the property, 
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of 
property of the estate.”216  According to the latter view, § 1334(e) does not 
merely grant in rem jurisdiction; rather, its primary purpose is to prevent 
multiple judgments relating to the same estate and thus undermining orderly 
distribution of assets.217  Because a discharge injunction violation necessarily 
occurs after the distribution of debtors’ estates, there is no risk of interference 
with the courts’ administration.218 
2.  Classes of Debtors in “Home Courts” 
Some courts allow debtors to seek relief as a class, but have limited the 
members of the class to those within the district of the “home court”219 in 
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 213. See, e.g., Bank United v. Manley, 273 B.R. 229, 232, 246–47 (N.D. Ala. 2001); 
Noletto v. Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp. (In re Noletto), 244 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 
2000). 
 214. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 215. See, e.g., Cano v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 551 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2009) (“The jurisdictional test for bankruptcy court jurisdiction is not whether each cause 
of action relates to or arises in or under an individual bankruptcy case.  The test is whether 
each cause of action relates to or arises in or under any bankruptcy case.”). 
 216. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2012). 
 217. See, e.g., Chiang v. Neilson (In re Death Row Records, Inc.), No. ADV. 10-02574, 
2012 WL 952292, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012) (holding that claims that are not 
solely in rem may be brought outside their “home court,” but holding contempt proceedings 
must remain with the issuing tribunal); Manley, 273 B.R. at 247 (holding that § 1334(e) only 
affects the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction “when a judgment converts the disputed claim into 
a finite unit of estate property” (citation omitted)). 
 218. Other provisions of the Code may support a departure from the view that § 1334(e) 
grants a bankruptcy court only in rem jurisdiction.  For example, § 541, which defines the 
property of the debtor’s estate in bankruptcy, exempts any wages the debtor earns after the 
case’s commencement. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2012).  However, a creditor seeking to recover 
these wages postdischarge would nevertheless be violating the discharge injunction, even 
though those wages were not part of the debtor’s estate. See In re Dickerson, 510 B.R. 289, 
292, 298 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2014) (holding that a creditor’s attempts to collect debtor’s 
postdischarge wages violated his discharge injunction). 
 219. See Richard H. Gibson, Home Court, Outpost Court:  Reconciling Bankruptcy Case 
Control with Venue Flexibility in Proceedings, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 37, 38 (1988). 
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which the bankruptcy petition was filed.220  Similar to courts that have 
allowed nationwide classes of debtors, these “home court” cases have 
allowed debtor classes under two theories.  The first adheres to an 
interpretation of § 1334(e) that supports that provision’s intended prevention 
of multiple judgments relating to the same estate.221  Restricting a debtor 
class to those whose estates have been administered by the same court do not 
implicate this concern, despite a departure from a rigid interpretation of the 
court’s in rem jurisdiction.222 
The second theory views § 524 as enforceable only through contempt 
proceedings.  Unlike those courts that have certified nationwide classes of 
debtors, however, the “home court” cases that rely on contempt proceedings 
conclude that an injunction may only be enforced by its issuing court.223  
Although classes of debtors necessarily involve aggregation of debtors from 
different bankruptcy cases, the theory holds these debtors may seek class 
relief if they all received an injunction from the same court.224 
3.  Classes of Debtors Not Permitted 
Finally, there are many courts that do not recognize debtor-plaintiff class 
actions.  They hold that a bankruptcy court may only preside over claims with 
a sufficient nexus to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.225  In reaching this 
conclusion, these courts rely on the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction 
and administration of a particular debtor’s estate.226  Accordingly, courts 
adopting this interpretation of bankruptcy subject matter jurisdiction are 
unlikely to allow a class action aggregating multiple debtors’ causes of 
action, regardless of how similar.  This would require collective treatment 
across multiple estates that were not previously consolidated in the same 
case.227 
 
 220. For a discussion of “home court” cases, see Bruce, supra note 6, at 56–62. 
 221. See, e.g., Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Williams), 244 B.R. 858, 866 (S.D. 
Ga. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Sears Roebuck, Co., 34 F. App’x 967 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 222. However, these courts do not go as far as those that allow for nationwide classes of 
debtors. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 223. See Beck v. Gold Key Lease, Inc. (In re Beck), 283 B.R. 163, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2002) (citing Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also 
Montano v. First Light Fed. Credit Union (In re Montano), No. 7-04-17866 SL, 2007 WL 
2688606, at *1–2 (Bankr. D.N.M. Sept. 10, 2007) (holding that debtors may enforce § 524 
through the court’s contempt powers but that the class must be limited to those who received 
their discharge from the District of New Mexico). 
 224. See In re Beck, 283 B.R. at 175. 
 225. One scholar has described these as “nexus” cases, in which the bankruptcy court has 
jurisdiction only over the debtor’s estate. Bruce, supra note 6, at 51–52. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See, e.g., Barrett v. AVCO Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 2 (D. Mass. 2003); 
Singleton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Singleton), 284 B.R. 322, 324 (D.R.I. 2002). 
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IV.  ANALYZING THE ARBITRABILITY OF 
POSTDISCHARGE § 524 DISPUTES UNDER THE 
“INHERENT CONFLICT” TEST 
As previously discussed, this Note does not seek to resolve the 
disagreements over the jurisdictional and enforcement considerations of 
§ 524.228  In addition, it does not propose the best way to consider classes of 
debtors.229  Rather, for the purpose of analysis, it assumes our former debtor 
may bring his dispute as a class.  Under this assumption, it proposes to resolve 
how courts should apply the “inherent conflict” test to determine whether to 
enforce a class-waiving arbitration clause in this context. 
Because of the frequency with which class waivers appear in arbitration 
clauses of consumer contracts,230 the determination of whether debtors may 
waive their procedural right to collectivize is inextricably tied to the 
arbitrability of their claim.  However, as discussed in Part I.D, courts disagree 
over the way in which class waivers figure into their arbitrability analysis.  
This Part will first apply the “inherent conflict” test to determine that a 
postdischarge dispute under § 524 is arbitrable and that the Bankruptcy Code 
does not provide debtors with a substantive right to collectivize.231  It will 
then address the enforceability of class waivers in bankruptcy in light of 
Italian Colors and will conclude that the “effective vindication” does not 
render such class waivers unenforceable. 
A.  Applying the “Inherent Conflict” Test to § 524 
Because both the text and the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code 
are silent as to the arbitrability of postdischarge disputes under § 524, courts 
must employ the “inherent conflict” test to determine (1) whether § 524 
disputes are arbitrable and (2) whether the class-waiving arbitration clauses 
inherently conflict with a substantive right to collectivize.232 
1.  The Arbitrability of Postdischarge Disputes Under § 524 
Although the circuits are split on the application of the “inherent conflict” 
test under McMahon,233 it is likely that either approach should lead to the 
same conclusion that § 524 disputes are arbitrable. 
Under the “inherent conflict” test of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, 
the first step in finding a dispute not arbitrable is to look to what, if any, rights 
 
 228. See supra Part II. 
 229. See supra Part III. 
 230. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 231. This Note uses the term “arbitrable” in this context to mean the bankruptcy court does 
not have discretion to refuse to compel arbitration. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Belton v. Ge Capital Consumer Lending, Inc. (In re Belton), No. 15-CV-1934 
(VLB), 2015 WL 6163083, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2015); see also Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 
823 F.3d 1147, 1158 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding a class-waiving arbitration clause was 
unenforceable because it “ran up against the substantive right to act collectively that the NLRA 
gives to employees,” despite holding the claim itself was arbitrable), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
809 (2017) (No. 16-285). 
 233. See supra Part I.D.2. 
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derive from § 524.234  In addition to the disputed treatment of § 524,235 the 
different language used by each of these circuits at this step perhaps 
complicates the analysis.  For example, the Fifth Circuit in In re National 
Gypsum first looked to whether the claim “derives exclusively from the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”236  The discharge injunction 
undoubtedly meets this test.  However, the Third and Ninth Circuits both 
refer to a claim “created by the Bankruptcy Code.”237  Strictly construed, 
courts may find that § 524 fails this test if they first conclude that § 524 
creates no actionable claim.238  If, however, these courts consider a “claim” 
in a less formal sense, it is likely they will find the first inquiry of the 
“inherent conflict” test satisfied. 
Under the approaches of the Second and Fourth Circuits, courts may avoid 
the thorny question of whether the discharge injunction of § 524 is a “claim” 
for purposes of the test by relying only on the second policy-based inquiry of 
the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.239  Therefore, if there is no dispute that 
§ 524 satisfies the first inquiry of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the 
tests employed by all circuits merge.  Accordingly, any court undertaking this 
inquiry will look to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code to determine 
whether an inherent conflict with the FAA necessitates a refusal to enforce 
an arbitration clause. 
 Perhaps because the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the “inherent 
conflict” test in bankruptcy, there is a debate as to whether this second 
purposive approach should find that the FAA conflicts with the purposes of 
a discharge injunction.  Nowhere is this debate more apparent than in the 
Southern District of New York, where a recent case on this very matter 
created an intradistrict split.  That case, In re Anderson, held a dispute of a 
discharge injunction violation not arbitrable under the “inherent conflict” 
test.240  Eight months earlier, the Southern District decided In re Belton, the 
facts of which were almost identical to those of In re Anderson.241  However, 
unlike the court in In re Anderson, the court in In re Belton held a discharge 
injunction violation to be arbitrable.242 
The disagreement concerned an interpretation of the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Hill, which applied the “inherent conflict” test to a violation of the 
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accompanying text. 
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Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision.243  However, that disagreement 
also brings into focus a larger dispute over how bankruptcy courts should 
apply the “inherent conflict” test.  The court in In re Anderson reasoned that 
a discharge is “so fundamentally related to a debtor’s fresh start” and that 
“arbitration is inadequate to protect such core, substantive rights granted by 
the Code.”244  The court in In re Belton, however, looked to whether the FAA 
“severely conflicted” with § 524 such that debtors could not vindicate their 
rights under the Bankruptcy Code.245 
As discussed in Part I.D.2, the Third Circuit proposed, and the Second 
Circuit adopted, three policy factors to consider:  (1) “the goal of centralized 
resolution of purely bankruptcy issues,” (2) “the need to protect creditors and 
reorganizing debtors from piecemeal litigation,” and (3) “the undisputed 
power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders.”246  Notably, these 
factors look not to the adequacy of arbitration as a forum but rather to the 
extent to which arbitration could disrupt the bankruptcy process.  The court 
in In re Belton similarly did not consider the adequacy of arbitration as a 
forum but instead held that arbitration does not “necessarily or seriously 
jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code” when a dispute “‘would 
not interfere with or affect the distribution of the estate’ and would not ‘affect 
an ongoing reorganization.’”247  In contrast, the court in In re Anderson 
looked to potential “high barriers” debtors may face in arbitration, including 
inefficient resolution of their claims.248 
In light of what the Supreme Court has held to be a “liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration,”249 the court’s approach in In re Belton was likely the 
correct one.  Indeed, a recent bankruptcy decision held that In re Belton was 
“better aligned with the federal policy favoring arbitration” and adopted its 
analysis over that of In re Anderson.250  It held that the enforcement of a 
class-waiving arbitration clause did not inherently conflict with § 524.251  
The Supreme Court has made clear that arbitrators are just as capable as 
courts of efficiently resolving complex matters.252  It held in McMahon that 
a court’s ability to refuse to compel arbitration is not grounded in the 
adequacy of arbitration as a forum but, rather, in the finding of an 
“irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and [a federal statute’s] 
 
 243. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 108–10 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 244. In re Anderson, 553 B.R. at 232–33. 
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 248. In re Anderson, 553 B.R. at 232 n.9.  The court reasoned that potential costs associated 
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220 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
underlying purposes.”253  Since McMahon, the “inherent conflict” test 
outside of bankruptcy has led to the presumption of arbitrability, and a party 
opposing arbitration faces a high hurdle in persuading the court to find an 
inherent conflict.254 
Bankruptcy courts are not insulated from McMahon and its progeny.  
Despite the unique considerations in bankruptcy, such as the centralizing pull 
of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction and the deference given to them on 
review of arbitrability determinations,255 bankruptcy courts must look only 
to a conflict of laws.  And although a court may conclude the discharge 
injunction is a court order that the issuing court alone may enforce,256 it may 
also conclude that the discharge order is not handcrafted such that the issuing 
court alone is qualified to interpret it.257  Indeed, the discharge injunction is 
not tailored to individual debtors even though each individual debtor receives 
his own discharge.  The discharge injunction has the universal effect of 
enjoining former creditors from pursuing any discharged debt and requires 
no bankruptcy expertise to interpret.258  Therefore, in light of the current state 
of FAA jurisprudence, discharge injunction violations are likely arbitrable. 
2.  A Substantive Right to Class Actions in Bankruptcy? 
The “inherent conflict” test also requires determining whether the 
Bankruptcy Code grants debtors a substantive right to challenge discharge 
injunction violations as a class.  However, no such right exists. 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to find an inherent conflict based on 
a substantive right for plaintiffs to collectivize under federal law, some 
circuits have refused to enforce class-waiving arbitration clauses.  Recently, 
the Seventh Circuit found in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp.259 a “contrary 
congressional command” in the NLRA sufficient to preclude class-waiving 
arbitration clauses in labor contracts.260  In that case, the court held that the 
statute’s legislative history supported the reading of its guarantee to workers 
to “engage in other concerted activities” to include the right to litigate as a 
class.261  The Ninth Circuit reached a similar holding, relying heavily on the 
analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Lewis.262 
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In contrast, no such right exists in bankruptcy.  The Bankruptcy Code does 
not contain any language similar to the NLRA guaranteeing debtors any right 
to collectivize.  Although the Bankruptcy Code may allow for debtor class 
actions,263 its permissiveness is a far cry from a guarantee.  This point is 
further supported by both the infrequency of debtor class actions and the 
disagreement over whether to allow debtors to dispute discharge injunction 
violations as a class.264  In light of this reading, bankruptcy courts should find 
class-waiving arbitration clauses enforceable in this context. 
B.  The Effect of Italian Colors on the 
“Inherent Conflict” Test in Bankruptcy 
Although the Supreme Court weakened the “effective vindication” 
doctrine with its decision in Italian Colors,265 some argue that the “inherent 
conflict” test in bankruptcy is largely insulated from its holding.266  One 
argument is that the “inherent conflict” test is more sensitive to costs incurred 
by debtors in bankruptcy than by ordinary plaintiffs.267  When a class-
waiving arbitration clause saddles debtors with steeper litigation costs, a 
court may hold such a clause unenforceable under the “inherent conflict” test, 
as the debtor is unable to effectively vindicate his rights.268 
The argument that the “inherent conflict” test insulates bankruptcy courts 
from Italian Colors relies on finding that the test in bankruptcy postdischarge 
is sufficiently different from Article III courts’ analysis of class waivers.  
This interpretation, however, is not supported by the Italian Colors decision.  
In its holding, the Supreme Court relied on the language of McMahon to hold 
that the antitrust claim at issue was arbitrable and that the class waiver was 
enforceable.269  It held that “arbitration is a matter of contract” and that 
“courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their 
terms.”270  A party’s only proverbial escape hatch to any arbitration 
agreement—including one in which he waived his right to litigate as a class—
is a showing of an inherent conflict of laws.  No part of the Italian Colors 
holding indicated the Court’s intention to cabin its decision to antitrust law 
specifically or areas outside of bankruptcy more generally. 
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The In re Belton decision provides a model for properly incorporating the 
Italian Colors decision.271  First, it looked to the debtors’ claim under 
§ 524.272  Upon finding no conflict between § 524 and the FAA, it then turned 
to the “effective vindication” doctrine of Italian Colors and found no 
impediment to the debtors’ right to pursue a statutory remedy in individual 
arbitration.273  Indeed, other courts that have interpreted Italian Colors in 
bankruptcy have come to a similar conclusion about the “inherent conflict” 
test.274 
V.  WHERE DOES OUR FORMER DEBTOR GO FROM HERE? 
Although the Supreme Court is comfortable deferring to arbitration if 
parties have agreed to resolve their disputes before an arbitrator, many have 
criticized arbitration as inadequate to protect consumers’ rights.  Class-
waiving arbitration clauses may stifle claims that consumers would otherwise 
bring absent barriers imposed by individual arbitration.  Accordingly, this 
section proposes a legislative remedy to provide debtors a nonwaivable 
private right of action that would allow them to litigate discharge injunction 
violations as a class in bankruptcy court. 
A.  The Shortcomings of Individual Arbitration 
If the Supreme Court’s confidence in the adequacy of arbitration is not 
misplaced, our former debtor might not worry about individually arbitrating 
his dispute over a discharge injunction violation.  In addition, even if he 
incurs arbitration fees, he likely does not face the same barrier to relief as the 
plaintiffs in Italian Colors;275 his dispute merely becomes more 
expensive.276 
Not all share the Supreme Court’s stance, however.  Some question the 
fairness of arbitrating many consumer-related disputes.277  Specifically, there 
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is evidence that arbitration does not always provide an easy path to resolution 
for individual consumers.278  In a recent article, Professor Judith Resnik 
reported that very few individual consumers pursue claims through 
arbitration relative to those eligible to bring claims.279  In contrast, a greater 
number of individual consumers pursue their claims in court relative to those 
eligible to bring claims indicating that courts are more accessible than 
arbitration.280  She therefore argues that mandatory class-waiving arbitration 
clauses serve to restrict consumers’ ability to pursue their rights despite some 
predictions that the clauses would lead to “thousands of separate 
proceedings.”281 
In addition, class-waiving provisions hinder the enforcement of many 
small-value claims.  Professor Resnik found that consumers rarely imagine 
they would themselves bring cases and concluded that private enforcement 
therefore depends on collective action.282  The inability to spread costs across 
a class may support consumers’ sentiments, particularly if the cost of 
bringing a claim exceeds the amount they stand to recover individually.  As 
Justice Kagan argued in her Italian Colors dissent, “No rational actor would 
bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring 
costs in the hundreds of thousands.”283  The inability to spread these costs all 
but prevents individuals from filing such claims in the first place.284 
This justification for class proceedings is as important in bankruptcy as in 
other areas of the law.  Because the costs of disputing a discharge injunction 
violation may very well exceed the likely recovery, individual debtors face 
the same barriers to recovery without the ability to collectivize.285 
Further, public enforcement by government entities on behalf of 
consumers likely depends on claims filed by private parties to bring 
companies’ illegal activities to the government’s attention.286  Although the 
Bankruptcy Code authorizes the Department of Justice to investigate creditor 
misconduct through the U.S. Trustee Program,287 many incidents of 
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misconduct are nevertheless likely to slip through the cracks absent private 
enforcement.288 
B.  A Legislative Solution 
In light of the considerations discussed in Part V.A, it is very likely that 
our former debtor will face significant hurdles to vindication of his right to a 
fresh start.  It is problematic, therefore, that present case law likely mandates 
the enforcement of the class-waiving arbitration clause in his credit 
agreement.  The evolution of bankruptcy law from a mere means to protect 
creditors to a regime that also protects the “honest but unfortunate debtor” 
demonstrates the importance of the discharge injunction.289  But the purpose 
of the discharge injunction is defeated if, in practice, creditors can use class-
waiving arbitration clauses as roadblocks to debtors’ attempts to fight 
systemic violations of § 524. 
The Bankruptcy Code grants substantial authority to bankruptcy courts to 
handle matters “arising under” the Code or “arising in” a bankruptcy 
proceeding.290  Indeed, in their “inherent conflict” test, most circuit courts 
recognize the bankruptcy courts’ ability to enforce their own orders as 
justification for refusing to allow arbitrators to resolve certain matters in 
bankruptcy.291  The wide disagreement over how to treat discharge injunction 
disputes demonstrates that, at present, § 524 does not grant bankruptcy courts 
sufficient authority to protect former debtors.292  And although a majority of 
courts agree that courts may enforce § 524 through contempt proceedings,293 
their interpretation of § 524 and their application of the “inherent conflict” 
test is muddied when a debtor seeks to dispute systemic discharge injunction 
violations as a class. 
In finding an inherent conflict by reasoning that a bankruptcy court may 
enforce its own orders,294 courts may do one of two things.  First, they may 
treat the discharge injunction as a court order tailored to an individual 
debtor’s proceeding.295  By doing so, they would necessarily preclude classes 
of debtors.  Second, they may characterize the discharge injunction as a 
“statutory injunction” and ground bankruptcy jurisdiction in the enforcement 
of the Bankruptcy Code rather than in the administration of an individual 
debtor’s estate.296  Accordingly, in the context of a discharge injunction 
violation, courts must read between the lines of the Bankruptcy Code and 
bend the meaning of an injunction to allow for class enforcement if they wish 
to avoid foreclosing the possibility of debtor class actions. 
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By allowing debtors to dispute systemic discharge injunction violations as 
a class, courts may avoid the problems of underenforcement and 
underdetection, as debtors have the financial incentive to bring suit.  
Congress should therefore amend § 524 of the Bankruptcy Code to create a 
private right of action that debtors may bring as a class in bankruptcy court. 
Congress has already recognized the potential for abuse of debt collections.  
In 1977, it enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),297 which 
creates a private right of action that allows consumers to directly sue abusive 
debt collectors,298 including on behalf of a class.299  However, the FDCPA 
limits debtors’ ability to seek relief by regulating only third-party debt 
collectors.300  In addition, although another statute—the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act—prohibits creditors from reporting inaccurate information to 
consumer reporting agencies,301 it does not prevent other forms of abuse.302  
As such, our former debtor is left without an express statutory grant to bring 
a class action against an abusive creditor under § 524.  By providing for an 
express right of action, Congress would close this gap and guarantee our 
former debtor the fresh start he deserves. 
An express private right of action does not resolve the arbitrability of the 
dispute, nor does it address the enforceability of a class waiver.  It has long 
been evident that the current state of the “inherent conflict” test in bankruptcy 
is uncertain and that clarity is needed.303  Accordingly, Congress should heed 
the proposals to enact legislation prohibiting class-waiving arbitration 
clauses in core proceedings.304  This bright-line rule, operating in conjunction 
with a debtor’s right to bring a class action, would bring much needed clarity 
to a muddy area of bankruptcy law and allow debtors to enjoy the full 
protection of their discharge injunctions. 
CONCLUSION 
A discharge injunction is a powerful incentive for consumers plagued by 
debt to enter into bankruptcy.  For some former debtors, however, the 
promise of a fresh start is illusive, as creditors continue to pursue discharged 
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debt in violation of § 524.  To add insult to injury, these debtors find 
themselves forced to dispute discharge injunction violations in individual 
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in their credit agreements.  In 
light of these class-waiving arbitration clauses, debtors cannot collectivize to 
spread litigation or arbitration costs, thereby jeopardizing their ability to 
vindicate their rights under the Bankruptcy Code. 
There is widespread disagreement over whether debtors may even dispute 
discharge injunction violations as a class in the first place.  Not only do courts 
disagree about how to enforce discharge injunctions, they also disagree over 
the types of disputes that allow for debtors to collectivize.  Even if courts 
were to agree that debtors may in fact collectivize to combat systemic 
violations of discharge injunctions, however, the Supreme Court’s “inherent 
conflict” test, which allows courts to refuse to enforce class-waiving 
arbitration clauses in certain contexts, likely leads to a finding that such 
clauses are enforceable in this context. 
Without debtors’ ability to collectivize, discharge injunction violations 
will be underenforced.  Given the importance of granting debtors a clean slate 
after discharge, Congress should take notice of the obstacles debtors face 
while attempting to combat a systemic violation of discharge injunctions.  By 
amending the Bankruptcy Code not only to provide debtors an express right 
of action under § 524 and the ability to collectivize but also to prohibit the 
arbitration of these claims, Congress will provide much needed clarity to this 
area of the law.  Such an amendment will fulfill the promise to debtors that 
they can truly begin anew after bankruptcy. 
